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Take Two: Stare Decisis in Antitrust/The Per Se Rule
Against Horizontal Price-Fixing
Randal C. Picker*
In this essay, I want to consider two issues that pertain to the overall
question of what antitrust doctrines are up for retirement. First, we
can’t consider that without understanding how the Supreme Court
approaches stare decisis in antitrust. The Court’s 5-4 decision in
Leegin1 identified some of the fault lines on this issue. The Court has
suggested that it should approach stare decisis differently in statutory
areas from the way it approaches it when it reconsiders constitutional
decisions. I think that that is wrong and that the Court should apply
its approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases to cases based on
statutes, such as the Sherman Act. Second, I focus on the evil of evils:
horizontal price-fixing. I don’t think that the Court is likely to retire
the per se rule against horizontal price-fixing, certainly not directly.
We might only realize that it had been overturned after the fact, after
the Court had so chipped away at the doctrine that nothing
remained. That said, as again Leegin itself suggested, we can’t be fully
confident that horizontal price-fixing is always pernicious, especially
when it might be implemented as part of a larger vertical
arrangement.
I. Stare Decisis in Antitrust2
We start by mapping the lay of the land in antitrust. For doing that,
almost any starting point would be arbitrary, but given that Leegin

* Copyright © 2008, Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved. Paul and Theo Leffmann

Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago Law School and Senior Fellow,
The Computation Institute of the University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory.
I thank the Paul H. Leffmann Fund and the Sarah Scaife Foundation for their generous
research support.
1 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 127 S Ct 2705 (2007).
2 This section is based on Section IV(D) of Randal C. Picker, Twombly, Leegin and the
Reshaping of Antitrust (forthcoming, Sup Ct Rev, 2008).
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overturned Dr. Miles3, we might start our analysis of stare decisis
from a point where the Court didn’t overturn Dr. Miles, its 1984
decision in Monsanto.4 Monsanto was the first of five antitrust cases
decided during the Court’s 1983 Term.5 The Solicitor General had
asked the Court to reconsider Dr. Miles in Monsanto, but in a
footnote, the Court declined to do so. Justice Brennan’s brief
concurring opinion focused exclusively on the status of Dr. Miles. He
emphasized the opinion’s longevity—73 years at that point—and the
fact that Congress had never enacted legislation to overrule Dr.
Miles.6
The 1983 Term is also interesting for the different ways that the
cases approached stare decisis. In Jefferson Parish, the Court
considered the law of tying, that is, the circumstances under which a
seller forces a purchaser to take one product with a second product.7
The question of whether or not to abandon the Court’s prior rule
that tying cases should receive per se treatment divided the Court.
The five-member majority believed that it was “far too late in the
history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that
certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling
competition and therefore are unreasonable ‘per se’.”8 The Court saw
a steady line of support for per se treatment going back to 1947
(International Salt) if not earlier.9 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, concurred briefly pointing to his earlier concurring opinion
in Monsanto and emphasizing that Congress had left alone the

3 Dr. Miles Medical Co v John D. Park & Sons Co, 220 US 373 (1911).
4 Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corp, 465 US 752, 761 (1984).
5 For discussion of those cases, see Diane Wood Hutchinson, Antitrust 1984: Five

Decisions in Search of a Theory, 1984 Sup Ct Rev 69.
6 Monsanto Co, 465 US at 768.
7 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2 (1984).
8 Id at 9.
9 International Salt Co v United States, 332 US 392 (1947).
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Court’s prior per se treatment of tying.10 But for Justice O’Connor
and the other three justices joining her opinion concurring in the
judgment, it was time “to abandon the ‘per se’ label and refocus the
inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic
benefits, that the tie may have.”11
But less than three months later, the Court took a different
approach to stare decisis in antitrust. In Copperweld,12 the Court
considered the question of whether a parent and its wholly-owned
subsidiary were legally capable of conspiring under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Yes, the two were distinct legal entities and hence could
contract with each other, but was that what Section 1 was looking for
in its focus on “every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade?” In a 5-3 decision, the
Court concluded that the parent and the sub lacked sufficient
separateness for Section 1 purposes. In so doing, the Court
“disapproved and overruled” its prior decisions that were inconsistent
with the rule announced in Copperweld. Which ones exactly was a
point of dispute between the majority and the dissenters. In dissent,
Justice Stevens counted at least seven decisions of the Court that he
believed to be inconsistent with Copperweld13 going as far back to
1947 (Yellow Cab).14 The majority attempted to recharacterize most
of the cases to suggest that they could have been decided on an
alternative basis and to suggest that the issue had never been

10 Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 32 (“Whatever merit the policy arguments against this

longstanding construction of the Act might have, Congress, presumably aware of our
decisions, has never changed the rule by amending the Act. In such circumstances, our
practice usually has been to stand by a settled statutory interpretation and leave the task of
modifying the statute’s reach to Congress”).
11 Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 35.
12 Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp, 467 US 752 (1984).
13 Copperweld, 467 US at 779-782.
14 United States v Yellow Cab Co, 332 US 218 (1947).

February 13, 2008

Page 3

Randal C. Picker

ABA Spring Antitrust Meeting

considered in real depth by the Court.15 Justice Stevens noted that
Congress could have revised the Court’s prior rulings on capacity to
contract for Section 1 purposes but had declined to do so over four
decades.16
From the 1983 Term through the 2006 Term—24 terms—the
Supreme Court decided 51 antitrust cases, or an average of more than
two per term.17 We can try a mechanical approach to the role of stare
decisis in antitrust. Of these 51 decisions, only five used the phrase
“stare decisis”: Leegin (2007); State Oil (1997); Eastman Kodak
(1992); Square D (1986); and Copperweld (1984)). That suggests
immediately one of weaknesses of the “tag cloud” approach to
matching text and ideas: both Jefferson Parish and Monsanto are
missing from the list, even though it was precisely the question of
stare decisis that separated the justices in Jefferson Parish and even
though Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Monsanto is almost
exclusively about the importance of not overturning prior decisions of
the Court.
We should start with a basic conception of stare decisis and then
work up from there. A minimalist approach to stare decisis might
focus on almost a physical notion of repeatability: if the same inputs
go into the same production system, the same output should result.
Treat the Court as a thing unto itself; not something made up of a
changing slate of nine individuals but instead as a coherent, integral
entity. In that formulation, mere changes in Court personnel
shouldn’t change case outcomes. If the Court reaches a conclusion, if
the same arguments are subsequently presented to a different

15 Copperweld, 467 US at 760 (“Although the Court has expressed approval of the

doctrine on a number of occasions, a finding of intra-enterprise conspiracy was in all but
perhaps one instance unnecessary to the result”).
16 Id at 784.
17 51 is the number that emerges from the Westlaw search, run on Nov 21, 2007, on
the Supreme Court database using the search request “to(29t) and date(after 1983) and
sy(antitrust sherman clayton (federal +1 trade +1 commission).”
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instantiation of the Court, the same outcome should result. This isn’t
to say that the Court can’t learn and therefore change results.
Operating experience under one rule and new arguments should
move the Court just as they do individuals, but it is precisely these
input changes that should result in different outcomes, not change in
the Court itself.
We might think that an odd, sterile and mechanical conception
of what the Court is. Do we really think that a Court comprised of
nine male justices would approach, say, the First Amendment status
of pornography in the same fashion as an all-female Court? If you
think not, then you probably believe that one of the inputs brought
to Court decision-making are the individual experiences of the
justices. We can submit the same briefs to one Court and then
resubmit them to a new Court and see different results because the
individual experiences of the justices shape outcomes.
We might think of stare decisis then as about the size of a
required change necessary to reach a different result, where stare
decisis might address either the non-court inputs to decisionmaking
or the court process itself. The input version of stare decisis would
focus on the required change in inputs that would permit the Court
to change outcomes. A thin-version might mean that even small
changes in inputs would cause the Court to change outcomes. So
even weak new arguments or small changes in data would cause the
Court to overrule a prior decision. A thick-input version of stare
decisis would require much more substantial changes in
circumstances before the Court would abandon prior positions.
A personnel-version of stare decisis might focus on voting rules
for cases, which the Court might implement by adopting a supermajority decision rule for overruling prior cases. Don’t overrule if the
vote is only 5-4 in favor; instead, require greater unanimity than
that.18 To be mechanical about this, a 6-3 or better rule would mean

18 Compare Jacob E. Gersen and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 Yale
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that a one-member change on the Court wouldn’t by itself change
results. A 5-4 case in one term couldn’t become a 5-4 decision the
other way if one of the original five justices were replaced by a new
justice who held the opposite view of the question.
The Court hasn’t articulated stare decisis in this fashion. Instead,
as Justice Breyer’s dissent in Leegin emphasized, the Court has
typically proceeded under a multi-factor approach. So the Court
believes that stare decisis weighs more heavily when it construes
statutes than when it reads the Constitution.19 This is based on the
view that, save for rare amendments to the Constitution, only the
Court can change how the Constitution is applied, but Congress can
rewrite statutes if the Court has misunderstood statutory text.
Congress’s knowing inaction then amounts to a type of silent
ratification of the Court’s interpretation of a particular statute.
That analysis dramatically overstates the ease with which
Congress can overturn the Court’s statutory interpretations. This
isn’t about the normal difficulties of getting legislation enacted in the
U.S.—though those hurdles are genuine—but much more about the
Court’s power to select positions strategically and know that they
won’t be overturned. Take a simple example. Assume the relevant
statute bears two natural interpretations. If the Court chooses one
and both the House and the Senate disagree with the Court’s choice,
we should expect Congress to rewrite the statute. In contrast, if the
Court chooses the interpretation favored by both chambers, Congress
leaves the statute alone. This seems to be the framework that
animates the Court’s views on the importance of stare decisis in cases
dealing with statutes.
But consider two other possibilities. The Senate and the House
have different preferences over the two natural readings of the statute.
L J 676 (2007).
19 In antitrust, see, eg, Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720, 736 (1977) (“[W]e must
bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory
construction, where Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation”).

February 13, 2008

Page 6

Randal C. Picker

ABA Spring Antitrust Meeting

The Court will choose one or the other, and whichever one the Court
chooses, we will not see legislation overturning that choice. If the
Court chooses the interpretation favored by the Senate, the Senate
will block legislation overturning that choice, and both the Senate
and the House must approve new legislation for it go forward.
Alternatively, if the Court chose the House’s favored interpretation,
the House will block new legislation.
In this simple situation—a statute with two natural readings—we
have four possibilities. We will see responsive legislation in only one
case—when the Court gets it “wrong” and the Senate and the House
both disagree with that choice—but in the other three cases, we
won’t see new legislation. In only one of those situations should the
Court infer acquiescence in the Court’s read of the statute; in the
other two cases, the two chambers don’t agree and therefore can’t
agree to overturn the Court’s interpretation. Note also that an
especially strategic Congress wanting to send information to the
Court might choose to pass confirmatory legislation in the case in
which the Congress agrees with the Court’s reading of the statute.
Given the presumed agreement between the houses, it should be
relatively costless to pass the confirming statute. The point of that
legislation isn’t to change the meaning of the text but to make clear
that when the Court interprets statutory text and nothing issues from
Congress, Congress disagrees internally over the meaning of the text.
Guaranteed action in both cases in which Congress agrees internally
would convey information to the Court about the existence of
internal disagreement in Congress over the meaning of the relevant
text in cases in which Congress doesn’t act.
Play this out briefly one more time. Imagine a text with three
readings, where the House’s preferences are 1 > 2 > 3 and the Senate’s
are just the opposite, 3 > 2 > 1. We shouldn’t expect Congress to
overturn any decision of the Court choosing any of the readings. If
the Court chooses 1, the House is happy and will block new
legislation. Ditto for the Senate if the Court chooses 3. And 2
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probably represents the compromise position that would be reached
by Congress were it required to act. A decision by the Court followed
by congressional inaction would tell us nothing about congressional
acquiesce in the Court’s reading. The Court’s approach to stare
decisis for statutes and its power to draw inferences from
congressional inaction and silence has ignored the way that that the
Court’s prior interpretation of a statute determines the default
position in the next round of legislative gamesmanship. As these
examples suggest, the default position established by the Court
matters enormously for the subsequent legislative path.
What does this mean for the Court’s special rules of stare decisis
for statutes, taking seriously, of course, that those rules actually exist
meaningfully? The Court should kill them off. Return to the simple
four-possibility situation. If the Court chooses the wrong
interpretation and Congress overturns it, very little harm is done. If
the Court reaches the result desired by both houses of Congress, we
probably won’t see legislation, absent the sort of exquisite legislative
signaling that I describe above. But in that case, the Court has
adopted the interpretation favored by the current Congress. And, to
head towards stare decisis, if the Court flipped its position, in these
cases, Congress would respond. The agreed Congress would overturn
the contrary interpretation by the Court.
But if the Court chooses an interpretation and Congress is
disabled from acting, what should the Court do in reconsidering the
issue? For constitutional issues, Congress is disabled from acting by
institutional design, as we have assigned the role of constitutional
interpreter to the Court. In our two remaining cases, Congress is
disabled from acting not by design but because of internal
disagreement. By definition, that internal disagreement is just the
opposite of acquiescence in the Court’s view. One chamber favors
one interpretation, the other the second, and that will be true
regardless of which interpretation the Court chooses. Under those
circumstances, the Court should give no special weight to that
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disagreement in figuring out whether to reconsider its prior ruling
but instead should rely on whatever general framework the Court
brings to stare decisis.
What does that mean for Leegin? In my view, the Court majority
appropriately gave very little weight to Congress’s changes to Section
1. Recall that Section 1 expanded in 1937 with the Miller-Tydings
fair trade delegation to the states and then contracted in 1975 when
Congress reclaimed federal authority under Section 1. But the Court
didn’t take that to somehow limit its ability to continue to evolve
Section 1 antitrust doctrine, and it understood itself to have full
authority to overturn Dr. Miles. That isn’t to say that the Court was
right to overturn Dr. Miles, as all I have done above is to sketch some
general ways to frame stare decisis and I haven’t offered a full theory
of it, but it is to say that the fact that Dr. Miles interprets a statute
shouldn’t be given real weight in the stare decisis analysis.
II. Rules for Horizontal Agreements Especially in a
Vertical Context
We know that the set of activities that are treated as being per se
illegal has shrunk over time. In some sense, antitrust doctrine has
been riding a century-long roller coaster: we spent a great deal of time
working our way up that large first hill and then we have rushed
down from there. I am not sure where we would date the peak of the
number of activities thought to be per se illegal, perhaps right before
Sylvania.
I want to focus on horizontally-implemented vertical rules. That
was a mouthful, so what do I mean by that? Take a series of questions
posed by Justice Stevens during the Leegin oral argument. Leegin was
represented by former Solicitor General Ted Olsen. Justice Stevens
asked him: “Mr. Olson, suppose just the dealers in New York, the
retail dealers agreed among themselves on the price. Would that be
lawful?” Olsen demurred saying that as a horizontal agreement
among retailers it would be per se unlawful. Justice Stevens persisted:
“Why should that be any different from the arrangement where those
February 13, 2008
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dealers all got together in the convention and recommended to the
manufacturer that he impose a vertical restraint of precisely the same
dimensions?”20
I want to frame that question and to do so let me describe how I
teach Interstate Circuit.21 That case, along with Theatre Enterprises22,
is the last time that the Supreme Court seriously undertook the
question of what was required to find a contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade that violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. But I start with the underlying activities and a start at a fairly
abstract point. So consider Figure 1:
Simple Consumer Choice

$6

$12

Figure 1

A consumer is presented with a choice. On the left, is an object or
stack of dollar bills worth $12; on the right is the same object, except
the second object is worth only six dollars. The consumer is free to
choose either object—either pie—and pays nothing. The consumer
can have something either worth $12 or $6. This is supposed to be an
easy choice. One of the first rules of economics is that more is better
than less assuming we’re talking about something that is good. So the
consumer should take the $12 pie on the left.

20 Oral Argument Transcript, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, No 06480, *4-5 (Mar 26, 2007).
21 Interstate Circuit, Inc v United States, 306 US 208 (1939).
22 Theatre Enterprises, Inc v Paramount Film Distributing Corp, 346 US 537 (1954).
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Then I switch the example to the situation in Figure 2:
Consumer Choice With
Spillovers
To Consumer

To Consumer

$4

$6

$8
To Producer
Figure 2

The pies are as before but the division associated with the first pie
has changed. If the consumer chooses pie two, again paying nothing,
the consumer receives an object were $6 as before. The first pie
continues to be worth $12, but now when that pie is chosen, the
consumer receives $4 and $8 goes to the producer. We again ask the
consumer to choose between pie 1 and pie 2 and presumably our
consumer chooses pie 2, again on the theory that more is better than
less and that all are consumer cares about is her pocketbook. But this
choice is socially inefficient meaning that society would be better off
if the consumer chose the first pie. Economists typically start with the
proposition that they are neutral about how pies are split; economists
want more pie and leave to others the question of how to divide the
pie. The first pie was bigger in Figure 1 and is also bigger in Figure 2,
but the division of value has changed, and now the private choice
made by the consumer no longer maximizes social welfare.
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I then consider the situation set forth in Figure 3:
Consumer Choice With New
Spillover Mechanism
To Consumer

To Consumer

$4

$3 $3

$8
To Producer

To Producer

Figure 3

The change from Figure 2 to Figure 3 is that now the $6 pie
when chosen channels $3 to the consumer and $3 to the producer.
Which pie will our consumer choose and how do we evaluate that
socially? In Figure 3, if the consumer chooses pie 1, she receives $4,
while if she chooses pie 2, she gets $3. Again on the principle that
more beats less, we should expect the consumer to choose pie 1. As
was the case in Figure 2, we want the consumer to choose pie 1. Now
the consumer does so and does so because more value is being
channeled to the producer from pie 2 in Figure 3—$3—than was the
case for that pie in Figure 2, where the producer received nothing.
This must seem like a long distance from the facts of Interstate
Circuit, so let us see if we can head there. Consider a hypothetical
involving a consumer who is choosing whether to see a movie today
or six months from now. Recall that the agreement in Interstate
Circuit was over the prices that would be charged at second-run
movie theaters in Texas. Those were movie theaters that would
receive a movie after had it already played in a first-run theater. Firstrun theaters understandably were concerned about the competition
that second-run theaters posed. Competitors rarely want more
competition, so the unhappiness of the first-run theaters shouldn’t
matter, unless something more interesting is going on.
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Back to our hypothetical consumer. She values seeing the movie
today at $12 and six months from now at $6. That difference in value
reflects the waiting costs of delay. That may be a standard preference
for consumption today over tomorrow but also reflects in the case of
things like movies and other culture objects that part of the
consumption is a private consumption—me sitting at home watching
the DVD on my television—and a second part is social
consumption—me talking about the movie at work with colleagues.
Movie watching in theaters is more naturally synchronized, DVD
watching less so. Watching a movie six months later on DVD
sacrifices much of the social consumption value.
The consumer movie values match the size of the pies we started
with in Figures 1 through 3. If the consumer could watch the movie
for free, we would be back to Figure 1 and presumably the consumer
would simply watch the movie today. But producers of movies
typically charge for viewing them, so the consumer is actually facing a
choice of 12 – p1—that being today’s price for the movie—versus 6 –
p2—the price of the movie six months from now. If we charge $8 for
a movie today and nothing to see it tomorrow, then we now match
Figure 2. To get to Figure 3, we need to live in a world in which the
price of the movie today is $8 and the price six months from now is
$3.
In this example, the movie version of Figure 2 might correspond
to a world in which illegal downloading and copying of movies was
easy; in that world, a consumer could count on being able to get the
movie for free six months from now. In that case, the consumer
would clearly wait to watch the movie, creating a social pie of $6
rather than paying to watch the movie today, which would create the
social pie of $12. And note that assumes that the movie would be
created; in a real example we would need to be concerned with
ensuring that movie producers receive sufficient payment to create
the movie in the first place. There is no movie to freely download
illegally at date two if a movie is never created at date one.
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Suppose we were in the world move version of Figure 2. How
should we feel about a mechanism which appeared which
transformed Figure 2 into Figure 3? To be clear, this is a mechanism
which somehow makes it possible for producers to gain a larger share
of the pie in movie sales six months out. On the hypo, that might
happen if we improved the enforcement of property rights in movies.
But there are other alternatives, including the possibility of reducing
competition between producers at stage two. In this example, doing
so would be welfare enhancing.
Note that the hypothetical embraces an overall-welfare standard
and not a narrow version of a consumer-welfare standard. If we just
focused on consumer welfare, we would want to prevent the
emergence of the stage two mechanism. Consumer welfare drops as
we move from Figure 2—where consumer welfare is $6 when the
second pie is chosen—to Figure 3, where it is $4 with the first pie is
chosen in Figure 3. The proper welfare measure is a controversial
issue in antitrust, and I do not mean to address it here in detail. I find
it hard not to think in overall welfare terms. Ultimately, individuals
own corporate producers and we should attribute corporate profits to
those individuals. Individuals should count, and not somehow just
individuals as consumers. In any event, my focus here is on total
welfare and, in this example, the new mechanism that splits the
second pie in Figure 3 increases overall welfare.
We might frame the question then as whether antitrust should
care about the source of that mechanism if we can with confidence
evaluate it directly. I understand this to be Justice Stevens’s question
at the Leegin oral argument. Minimum RPM is minimum RPM
regardless of whether it is implemented horizontally by a group of
local New York dealers or whether it is imposed one step up the
vertical food chain by a manufacturer.
Take another step closer to the facts of Interstate Circuit. There is
clearly a relationship between first-run and second-run movie
markets. Sure there is a basic price competition between those
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markets but there are other spillovers that take place. If a first-run
theater advertises the new blockbuster, that create creates demand for
the second-run theater. That is easy to see if the theater markets are
separated mainly by the income of the consumers. High-income
consumers see movies today, while lower-income consumers wait to
see them tomorrow. An ad when the movie comes attracts highincome consumers today to the first-run theater, but low-income
consumers aren’t going to see the movie today. But the initial ads
create built-in demand six months down the road. Advertising might
influence the willingness of those consumers see the movie at all, and
if so, advertising by a first-run theater would create benefits for the
second run theater.
This is a standard free-riding issue and we might be that
concerned that the spillover would lead to the underproduction of
advertising, absent some sort of assurance for the first-run theater that
they would recover sufficient fraction of the benefits of advertising.
Now we might think in that situation that the movie studios would
understand this and would have the incentive to internalize
advertising across markets. They of course might do that by
integrating vertically in the movie business, as indeed they once did
prior to the antitrust decree in Paramount. But if we block vertical
integration, then we might need some other mechanism to address
competition between first- and second-run movie theaters. I don’t see
a reason to assume why the movie studios will necessarily have a
better sense of what those mechanisms might look like than the
theaters themselves.
We might be able to identify one or more classes of horizontal
agreements fixing prices that we might think should be outside the
per se rule of illegality. Justice Stevens hints that he might think that
horizontally-implemented vertical rules might fall into that category.
Obviously, merely suggesting that some horizontal price-fixing
agreements might be useful isn’t enough. The per se rule is a rule
about most cases and a single example or a handful of examples may
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still be insufficient. I don’t know how many horizontal cases might be
thought to fall within the class of horizontal agreements that should
be evaluated under the rule of reason. I have never been quite sure
what to make of Broadcast Music.23 On one version of the case, it
looks like broad horizontal activity. On another characterization, we
emphasize that the blanket license is a new product and given that the
access to the underlying compositions isn’t exclusive, we might go
beyond the rule of reason to regard the creation of the new product as
wholly outside of Section 1. A raw focus on output might drive this:
the new blanket license expands the opportunities available to
consumers of performances—restaurants, radio stations and the
like—and thus shouldn’t be understood as a restraint on trade at all
(again, conditioned on the nonexclusivity provisions of the license).

23 Broadcast Music, Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 441 US 1 (1979).
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